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Abstract 
The One Belt One Road initiative is found to promote China’s overseas lending in the belt road 
countries, especially for countries along the continental route. Such effect strengthens and persists 
for at least three years. Our findings show that launching a national strategy could be a decisive 
determinant of one country’s outbound loans. 
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“China’s commitment to building infrastructure in countries covered by its ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
initiative - a scheme to boost development along ancient ‘silk road’ trading routes between China 
and Europe - is revealed by data showing that the lion’s share of Beijing’s recent overseas lending 
pledges have been in countries that lie along the routes.” 
                                                                                       
                                                                                                       Financial Times (June 18, 2015) 
1. Introduction 
 
Banks from developed countries often provide credits to developing countries (Dymski, 2003), 
as marginal returns are usually higher in less developed regions (Healey, 1995). Despite extensive 
studies regarding advanced countries’ overseas lending (Goldberg, 2002; Porzecanski, 1981), that 
of large developing countries such as China is largely left uncharted.  
In addition to economic considerations, developing countries’ overseas lending features 
political reasons, especially for state-owned banks having such objectives rather than profit 
maximization goals (Berger et al., 2004; Berger, 2007; Dinc, 2005).1 As China becomes an active 
international lender in recent decades, it is pivotal to ask whether and how China’s overseas 
lending is motivated by its recent foreign policies. This motivates our study of the grand One Belt 
One Road (OBOR) policy initiative and it is intriguing to investigate whether China’s aggregate 
lending favors OBOR countries in the wake of this national strategy.2 
The OBOR initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in autumn 2013 during his visit 
in Kazakhstan, where he unveiled the vision of an ‘Economic Belt’ (i.e. the land belt) linking China 
with Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and ends up in Western Europe. Soon, President 
Xi proposed a similar ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (i.e. the sea road), which runs through Southeast Asia, 
the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, to the same destination as the Economic Belt. Comprising 
both the land belt and the sea road, the OBOR is not only a network of ports, railways, roads, 
                                                 
1
 Not surprisingly, China’s official commitments are also found to be primarily driven by its foreign policy (Dreher 
& Duchs, 2016; Dreher et al., 2018). 
2
 China’s overseas lending is mainly through its state-owned banks (Horn et al., 2019). It includes the two state-owned 
policy banks (China Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank) and the four state-owned commercial banks 
(The Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China 
Construction Bank).  
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pipelines connecting China with the targeted regions, but a blueprint that access to new markets 
for trade and investments, and diplomatic policies to enhance multilateral relationships. Up to 2017, 
the OBOR strategy covers 68 target countries with around 8 trillion dollars invested in 
infrastructures such as transportation networks, energy, and telecommunications (Balding, 2017; 
Moser, 2017). 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two folds. First, it mostly relates to recent 
works investigating the impacts of the OBOR initiative on trade and investments (e.g. Du & Zhang, 
2018; Herrero & Xu, 2017; Hurley et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019). Further, there are only narrative 
descriptions rather than statistical evidences when discussing China’s loans and grants to OBOR 
countries (Bräutigam, 2011; Cheng, 2016; Kynge, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2017; Yu, 2017). Our work 
fills the gap and establishes a causal relationship of the policy impact. 
Second, studies relating China’s overseas lending (Dreher & Fuchs, 2016; Dreher et al., 2018; 
Hurley et al., 2019) often do not take “hidden debts” (i.e., undisclosed foreign official lending 
flows) into account. Zucman (2013) and Coppola et al. (2019) argue that China’s lending to 
developing countries involves offshore financial centers and/or borrowers’ foreign banks, which 
makes their oversea loans hard to track. Since such opaqueness could potentially bias the results, 
and we use a new data set constructed by Horn et al. (2019) that explicitly addresses the problem. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and variables, Section 
3 presents the identification strategy, Section 4 provides the empirical results, Section 5 checks the 
robustness and Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Data and variables 
 
Our main data is from Horn et al. (2019), which includes debt stocks owned by Chinese 
official and state-owned creditors. It mitigates the “hidden debt” problem by matching from both 
debtor sides and creditor sides, namely the Debtor Reporting System (DRS) and the BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics. The data is considered as one of the most reliable and updated sources of 
China’s overseas lending. Our country year-varying controls used in section 3 are from the Penn 
World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). 
We mainly follow Du & Zhang (2018) to construct the belt-road country list. We also 
manually update the list, as it is constantly expanding. According to China’s official 
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announcements, we further collect the year of agreement signed with those OBOR countries, 
which we use in section 5. The country list together with the OBOR signature year are provided 
in the online supplementary material. 
Our final sample contains 105 recipient countries, with 51 OBOR countries (38 on the land 
belt and 13 on the sea road) in 8 years from 2010 to 2017.3 Table 1 presents the summary statistics 
and Appendix Table A lists variable definitions and their sources. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
2. Identification Strategy 
 
To gauge the impact of the OBOR initiative on China’s overseas lending, we employ a 
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, following Du & Zhang (2018) and Mao et al. (2019). 
Specifically, we use the OBOR countries as the treatment group and the non-OBOR countries as 
the control group. Treating the policy announcement in late 2013 as an exogenous shock, we define 
years on or after 2014 as the post period, and year 2010 to 2013 as the pre-shock period. Our 
baseline DD model is thus specified as follows: 
  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                            (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of China’s total overseas lending to country i in year t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a 
dummy variable and equals to 1 if t is after year 2014 and 0 otherwise. 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 is an indicator 
variable and equals to 1 if the recipient country i is an OBOR country and 0 otherwise. 𝛾𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of country-specific controls such as GDP, population, capital stock, exchange rate, etc. Note 
that model (1) does not include 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖, as they are absorbed by the recipient country 
(𝜃𝑖) and year fixed effects (𝛼𝑡) respectively. The standard error is clustered at borrower country 
level to account for potential serial correlations within that country. Moreover, loan commitments 
could also be path dependent, as loans to developing countries often follow schedules spanning 
                                                 
3
 Our choice of the start year is standard and follows the related literature such as Du & Zhang (2018). 
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over years (Kraay, 2014). To alleviate such concern, we include lagged loan amount in some 
specifications. We also present results incorporating the lagged country controls.  
To substantiate our argument that the changes in China’s overseas lending is solely due to the 
OBOR policy initiative, we adopt the following time-varying DD model treating the exact year of 
the OBOR agreement as the shock year: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                  (2) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable and equals to 1 after country i signs the agreement 
with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. Other notations and the cluster standard error are the same 
as model (1). The coefficient 𝛽1 would estimate how loan amount changes for signatory i.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the coefficients of year fixed effect from 2011 to 2017, using 2010 as the 
base year. The advantage of this standard approach is to control for countries’ unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneities (Schularick, et al., 2012). It is observed that the OBOR countries tend to 
receive more loans and the growth rate is also increasing after 2014. In contrast, the non-OBOR 
countries has relative steady experience through 2011 to 2017, reflecting the fact that the OBOR 
strategy neither promotes nor harms their loans. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Next, we turn to our DD analysis. Table 2 first shows the result of the parallel trend test. As 
all interaction terms are not significant, our DD strategy is valid. The commitment loan amounts 
between the OBOR and non-OBOR countries exhibit no statistical differences for the years prior 
to the policy announcement. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Then we turn to our main results examining the impact of OBOR initiative on China’s overseas 
lending. Column (1) and (2) of Table 3 show significant and consistent positive effects of this 
policy initiative by comparing the changes between the OBOR countries and the non-OBOR 
countries, regardless of whether lagged country controls are included or not.4 The results still hold 
in column (3) and (4) when controlling for the lagged loans, ruling out the possibility that the 
increased lending after the policy initiative is purely due to previous loan agreements. In particular, 
the positive significant lagged period one lending supports the argument that China’s policy loans 
could be path dependent (Kraay, 2014; Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015). Moreover, the coefficient in 
column (4) shows that on average, China’s oversea lending to the OBOR countries increases by 
98 percent after this grant policy initiative. 
Next, we explore the potential heterogeneities on loans to the continental and the maritime 
routes. Columns (5) to (8) exhibit a strong inclination on loans to land belt countries, after 
controlling country lagged controls and/or lagged loans. It implies, according to column (8), that 
the land belt countries’ loans are about 1.3 times higher in the post-strategy years relative to those 
of sea road countries. The drastic increase might be explained by the large-scale infrastructure 
projects in land belt countries (Cerutti & Zhou, 2018), which is consistent with the findings 
regarding China’s outward direct investment (ODI) (Du & Zhang, 2018). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
We further analyze the dynamic effect of the OBOR initiative on China’s overseas loans in 
Figure 2, using 2010 as the base year. Despite the insignificant differences between OBOR and 
non-OBOR countries, it is observed that the aggregate lending upsurges instantaneously in 
response to the policy announcement in year 2014. Moreover, such effect persists and escalates 
until the end our sample period. A plausible explanation is that a government’s official lending 
programs may send a positive signal (Kawai & Liu, 2001), which encourages Chinese banks to 
involve more heavily in the OBOR countries. Overall, the dynamic analysis shows the long run 
vision of this national strategy and the increasing commitments from Chinese official creditors.  
                                                 
4
 Note that the number of observations of our results does not decrease when including lagged variables, as Horn et 
al. (2019)’s data starts in 2000 while the first year in our estimation is 2010. 
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4. Robustness check 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
One potential critique is that our results might be driven by other factors rather than the OBOR 
initiative itself, as many other incidents affecting China’s official lending could take place in model 
(1)’s common shock year setting. To address the concern, we employ an extended DD model 
incorporating one crucial recipient country time-varying factor: the year of signature, as China 
signed the OBOR agreements with countries in various years. The impacts of loans on the OBOR 
countries and land-based countries are presented in Table 4. Column (1) and (2) show that the 
agreement to join the initiative causes a strongly positive effect on China’s overseas lending 
relative to their non-signatory and sea-road peers respectively, indicating the substantial supports 
from Chinese official creditors in advocating this national strategy. Both specifications control for 
the lagged treatment 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 up to three years, and no significant changes of China’s lending 
are found prior to the year of signature. Thus, they alleviate the reverse causality concerns and 
shows the robustness of our estimations. That is, it is not the loan commitments per se that induce 
countries to join the OBOR initiative and sign the agreements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Using a novel and rigorous loan data, this paper investigates whether China’s overseas lending 
favors the One Belt One Road countries. Our difference-in-differences results show that the 
initiative does promote China’s outbound lending, and especially to the land belt countries. The 
impact intensifies and continues throughout our sample period. Our results are robust if adopting 
the year of signature as an alternative shock. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature that 
a national strategy’s launch could be a critical determinant of one country’s overseas loans. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics. 
This table presents the summary statistics. Detailed definitions of all the variables are 
listed in Appendix Table A. 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loan Amount (Log) 839 19.384 4.744 0.000 24.344 
GDP (Log) 839 26.310 1.912 21.294 30.894 
Population (Log) 776 18.568 1.750 13.454 23.318 
Capital Stock (Log) 776 28.424 1.870 23.535 33.333 
Depreciation Rate (Ratio) 776 0.049 0.014 0.021 0.102 
Exchange Rate (Ratio)  776 1129.850 3510.052 0.088 33226.300 
Capital Services (Ratio) 560 1.132 0.239 0.137 3.034 
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Table 2 Parallel trend test. 
This table presents the results of parallel trend test. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
aggregate loan amount. Each year dummy is interacted with OBOR countries before the policy 
announcement. For brevity, we do not report the estimates for 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖.Country fixed effect 
is included. Robust standard errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Amount 
2011 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖  -0.705 
 (0.564) 
2012 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 -0.365 
 (0.467) 
2013 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 -0.781 
 (0.568) 
Constant 18.27*** 
 (0.220) 
Country FE Yes 
Observations 839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.698 
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Table 3 The impact of the OBOR policy on China’s overseas lending. 
This table shows the DD results investigating the impact of the OBOR policy on China’s overseas lending. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of China’s aggregate loan amount to the recipient country. Both country controls, country and 
year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Column (1) to (4) are the DD results on all countries. Column (1) is the 
baseline and (2) adds the country lag controls. Column (3) and (4) includes lagged loans up to 3 years with and without 
lagged country controls. Column (5) to (8) shows the corresponding results for land belt road countries. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
   All Countries  OBOR Countries  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Amount  Amount Amount  Amount Amount Amount  Amount  Amount 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 1.378** 1.376*** 1.010*** 0.981** 
 
  
 
 
(0.525) (0.509) (0.371) (0.399) 
 
  
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 * 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖     2.653*** 2.893*** 1.323** 1.347* 
    
 (0.908) (0.965) (0.636) (0.713) 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-1)   0.494*** 0.502***   0.504*** 0.488*** 
   (0.0731) (0.0755)   (0.0870) (0.0756) 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-2)   0.0376*** -0.0203   -0.0313 0.0371 
   (0.0138) (0.0276)   (0.0254) (0.0672) 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-3)   -0.0173 -0.0133   -0.0163 -0.0170 
   (0.0206) (0.0194)   (0.0505) (0.0624) 
Constant 70.70 36.5 -17.41 -60.58 135.1 54.53 -5.156 -235.5 
 
(158.1) (164.8) (123.5) (123.6) (292.3) (300.9) (229.6) (238.8) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Lag Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 280 280 280 280 
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.812 0.855 0.859 0.820 0.825 0.859 0.868 
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Table 4 The impact of signing the OBOR agreement on China’s overseas lending. 
This table shows the time-varying DD results investigating the impact of the OBOR agreement on China’s 
overseas lending. The dependent variable is the logarithm of China’s aggregate loan amount to the recipient 
country i. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡it is a dummy variable and equals 1 after country i signs the agreement with China in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡* 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable and equals 1 after land-based country i 
signs the agreement with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. Country fixed effect, year fixed effect, country 
controls and lagged treatment variables 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡it up to three years are included in all specifications. 
Column (1) presents the result for the OBOR countries and column (2) is for the land belt countries. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Amount  Amount  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 1.066* 
 
 
(0.562) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡* 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖  1.959* 
  (1.007) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-1) 0.298 0.539 
 
(0.413) (0.946) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-2) -1.037 0.545 
 
(0.699) (1.464) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-3) -0.135 0.0471 
 
(0.672) (1.599) 
Constant 3.994 199.2 
 
(157.7) (337.3) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes 
Country Lag Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 560 280 
Adjusted R-squared 0.812 0.826 
 
  
15 
 
 
Figure 1 The year trend of aggregate loan amount to OBOR and non OBOR countries. 
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Figure 2 The dynamic effects of the OBOR initiative in China’s oversea loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1: Recipient country list. 
This table lists all the recipient countries in our analysis, as to their alphabetical orders. 
Countries denoted by # and * are land-road countries and sea-belt countries respectively. 
 
Albania* Dominica Mauritius Tanzania 
Algeria Ecuador Mexico Togo 
Angola Egypt* Mongolia# Tonga# 
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Montenegro* Turkey# 
Armenia#  Eritrea Morocco Turkmenistan# 
Azerbaijan# Ethiopia Mozambique Uganda 
Bahamas Fiji* Myanmar* Ukraine# 
Bangladesh* Gabon Namibia Uruguay 
Belarus# Ghana Nepal# Uzbekistan# 
Benin# Guinea Niger Vanuatu 
Bolivia Guyana Nigeria* Venezuela 
Bosnia#  India* Oman# Vietnam* 
Botswana Indonesia* Pakistan# Yemen, Rep.* 
Brazil Iran# Papua New Guinea Zambia 
Bulgaria#  Jamaica Peru Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso# Jordan# Philippines* 
Burundi# Kazakhstan# Romania# 
Cabo Verde# Kenya* Russia# 
Cambodia*  Kyrgyzstan# Rwanda 
Cameroon Laos* Samoa 
Central African Republic Lebanon# Senegal 
Chad Lesotho Serbia* 
Chile Liberia Seychelles 
Colombia Macedonia, FYR# Sierra Leone 
Comoros# Madagascar South Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi# South Sudan# 
Congo, Rep. Malaysia* Sri Lanka* 
Costa Rica Maldives# Sudan# 
Cote d'Ivoire# Mali Suriname 
Djibouti Mauritania Tajikistan# 
  
 
 
 Table A2: The signatory years of One Belt One Road countries. 
This table illustrates the signatory years of the recipient countries, as to their alphabetical orders and the news sources respectively. 
 
Country Sign year Sources 
Albania 2017 http://wmzh.china.com.cn/2018-11/29/content_40596228.htm 
Armenia  2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=2lDm00NjrtMTZMwmOQaGNtJ3Nk8-
cx4ERPZqGlxErGuGXO7lMAnpfJCvIpLVb_kP1IoiXPz3l5moRti2cunAQESgI2iLSHYtKkSsHmARYIm&wd=&eqid=d49af4dd0006d564
000000065dde42c7 
Azerbaijan 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=7-
iWERPnubMphUG6FKia0mtuVJvGmFD_vtG7Ynyz8TIGBujozJpNrWDkrYZ1AmkIgJwFUr91iUfgXTdiO_4-
P15jYSpjf__GBh77qT0DoIK&wd=&eqid=fb3fbe1c00045fc8000000065dde37d2  
Bangladesh 2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=z9gsN2EIlLu68wij7bK0YG14Y5LEWOBks5JVIBmd9EEYLa9JBMQOKJ-
ODSrT1watS7ei6nuIaAwyda9vy7nemGpweRhjq7jVjOxrqqL43ge&wd=&eqid=91fa8848000a81a0000000065dde434e  
Belarus 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=vMXenUY-
Fr8deYEQTzl0K4bHCq1_4GtW9vLAfR5608484cCQiTUBs4KD3ddzK_4fxIYjKOvHWqXMsBMY20EU3a&wd=&eqid=a596823b00058
50f000000065dde43b1 
Benin 2019 https://weibo.com/5282792576/IbzXx8hSm?type=comment  
Bosnia  2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=29hhs94yPOE3Hd2Ppiut8k8Ieav9of3mER1sDpTf2e2OTvtSqPmkfmNVSV5S_aQE15PM4PQ0uX1l5rYU
RRyf6WIHmcE_ceuEQXxcZOrKm87&wd=&eqid=8f3561a6002f0610000000065ddd3e31  
Bulgaria  2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=0htgAwkyqnx_Q8WXraqpIAf7nc315TAl3bPEz3RbKSIO6QPt9zWY0W5s3En4uaxYT53X9Tw1tXHmc
w7iNeJLL03zGuwz-aeqAJWMo86bvae&wd=&eqid=906f81eb000439a9000000065dde387d 
Burkina Faso - - 
Burundi 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Cabo Verde 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Cambodia  2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=j52AtMrK8o8pDZDalaRTY-RvwHnPAANLJipxUQTWeecwJN3PyjmzLnqhsI1EitAq8TcQ1aJl-daQ-
LHrR3zb8K&wd=&eqid=abe6d41b0009147f000000065dde44a7 
Comoros 2018 http://news.eastday.com/eastday/13news/auto/news/china/20180831/u7ai8024912.html  
Cote d'Ivoire 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Egypt 2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=GtFxG7zpuokIMyqCRjM-zGPSyEvnXaW2CH7Kd6RyPRVUds-LPwI2SF-
R9_D_VgRb6OuWlqxNVM6Gwz3weqexzNkRqfgkIF2qO7Eaa9vS2m2rzm_BeecBILilWLaDLgBv&wd=&eqid=f24339c90003a22300000
0065dde3240 
Fiji 2018 http://srcf.urumqi.gov.cn/2016n/cxdt/409980.htm  
India N.A. 
 
Indonesia 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=5GpeYKUQgiLrcNUqQKuxSylYjz5EbsPe8EJvH_3ojsCwwkEnALJ22Mm3l1nAIk_2&wd=&eqid=d06c2
e4700000ab6000000065dde45a3 
Iran 2016 http://mil.chinanews.com/gn/2016/01-23/7729188.shtml  
Jordan 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Rwq2kDmFhcJsS0lsYU9KOYXa0Fpl3rEDw3Z4pfWvGBfypDIAo-
dWWa9MH0q304kT&wd=&eqid=e6f89cc60001e63a000000065dde4b98 
Kazakhstan 2014 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml 
Kenya 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Kyrgyzstan 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=rDdsiSPdpEQEuPCADxuW2ynNwj7d5zuXjeZpZaZ1OywJYoAbMWoTTuWdZ-
ZVprbaw3qvCxWA78v2yOvtYuJtX1ASYG8yPq7bSqWrNNDNUwe&wd=&eqid=c328310a00020cdf000000065dde4cf7  
Laos 
2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=mYzaGPysR2c68eyfZtvAA4Pi8PG69qz8rD2DsPXF0_2gLKFK9Q-
GWxoKDCPhr4jtsjDfNbi5iEC60oItftNDrq&wd=&eqid=a8f54561000288fa000000065dde4d0d  
Lebanon 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=QwFd6ucKLE1mninPyMm639hyBJWZhYckqZHmcvIX8HLO665yVpOTcoq3D1a18n4Z_NgBYKmIdao
gm-2c8wYkSa&wd=&eqid=e1455fed0001bca1000000065dde31b3 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=xTtW4xjQVf80jsY0XozgksE1QPGgDsW4TO8vMUjmz7fwMaSUdW4pVU0YYPgVzPanIIh1ttZEtZRnlz
m9S0V4Uq&wd=&eqid=f1ad3737000336ec000000065dde4d30 
Malawi N.A. 
 
Malaysia 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=ek2op9k3tjrDnMjkJ9qNQIa6ox1WoAdMdzAIy3vb8MdIg5gaa1KbgCzgA3_fdm_SE1EFkTf2_VLVmEA
_dADLeq&wd=&eqid=a47ef08700068b93000000065dde5485 
Maldives 2014 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml 
Mongolia 2016 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml 
Montenegro 2017 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-08-09/doc-ihytcitm7873343.shtml  
Myanmar 2017 http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/291.html  
Nepal 
2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=XrRVArV4oshIzXWvpuGlDRwLq2UznNZH_cJOJU4KQz6_QRUzXyAKBmImH4onYOT1nPK-
ZX0F8Q_1GuSjyUvo3keUoBnIPxXtjgbJTljfEs3&wd=&eqid=be07c28000055581000000065dde5597  
Nigeria 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Oman 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=MJpMc1KzrHukDgsJmzaoeME0sccFsGqsdL6o8WyyLufw9h3Kc_4X7TGxe5bp7RW1aJidCquUTEDrl_-
CfudJq_O7x5INbTEoTU7UyLzg-RC&wd=&eqid=ecda24460001d6f4000000065dde4923 
Pakistan 2015 http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/EDNN11L50538107F.html  
Philippines 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=XfWRpXTsGPUWwYKbnHu9uFEPIXKVbWBOG1W4yzKD8i9oiLlNQg2az2S5Burb6V5l&wd=&eqid=
f9a763e40004d967000000065dde3458 
Romania 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=zuYLez9JDuyS3Pmb9MWuIwnh13iifzWfUHYdXJuH7XkGnVDPM08hN7ix36hpwVudbnIxHp3GWbAz
Et0hZr-GfBfqGZZwfWeUaTmvrXwShimu_qsiDYn3KVOrb26yccd7&wd=&eqid=bd488c660007cba7000000065dde3b7a  
Russia 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Z7yrihrARc9WZjGK_A8OCAeU82qvK7tkd0Xbr0ElK-msIJnsfcVUTlm5KG48BOD6XKCnm2E-
EHpizIEvXIE-9HkYOGlyRRO9SeNqgcq12oy&wd=&eqid=a3b2178e0000d426000000065dde4181 
Serbia 2015 http://www.chinanews.com/tp/hd2011/2015/11-26/585506.shtml  
South Sudan 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Sri Lanka 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Gr6F23BtFzejCinPL1v6X4o2vNR61fsqjarr--dnXKPHFdebJdR4C0kB-
adBzgjYDbckkHEbyfWRl0xiNf1UuoEtv_f9CYlM8LGuxEYTNka&wd=&eqid=85f91dbb000531cf000000065dde39a0  
Sudan 2018 http://m.haiwainet.cn/middle/3542291/2018/0716/content_31353989_1.html  
Tajikistan 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=4BDYsida3IwQuIgXuoeGJ_Lz0kD1LEBOWKjZRw8szIdvNshnq8CB-x_Qo--
NlxRH&wd=&eqid=fb85773f0003171d000000065dde4f2a 
Tonga 2018 http://sputniknews.cn/politics/201811181026869322/ 
Turkey 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=sU7LiD9NyPaDoZSAMPSdRScyPXBbLEPpTcMIY8S55_URmUb4J92Tde_R1D6_VTRAQc-
JAeZxWJFNvQWzQfK16BlpoRlT6kBlqmRHSZmdLKK&wd=&eqid=d3796e600008d3e5000000065dde4026  
Turkmenistan 2015 http://www.scio.gov.cn/m/31773/35507/35515/35523/Document/1625566/1625566.htm 
Ukraine 2014 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=5MYTGGoXKxyiCF7MEGlpVKZFrWnOh4-
62GoqS4PNwBexqrl8q_L9Gwg4VFbSpz69&wd=&eqid=c328310a0004696d000000065dde5707 
Uzbekistan 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=SOSCA3A7QpEU5uvwcA2sZ127LraXljI99DtF7bZ7PDLt8Qn4subXf8T92qhYVg8V34DrhPgS6rdG20G
7JQazvKUD9gW_By4VzIA22ZVfPxYjgUCzRAZXTJHTo4peEZZF&wd=&eqid=e372ea5b000b9a0b000000065dde5291  
Vietnam 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=qzFsJP2xwugHNkaPJJbePsKrIAV9h5jSbEBRzp_fi6rqfKNCg7XHYs37FHrIX7unWMzQl4bOJNfV-
mI4QTArHZjpRetvYW-3YHH91CALP9e&wd=&eqid=f499a51a000563e2000000065dde3a83 
Yemen, Rep. 2019 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-04-28/doc-ihvhiewr8617644.shtml  
 
